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Senegalese migrants’ children, homeland returns, and Islamic education in a 
transnational setting 
 
Homeland visits and stays have only recently began to receive attention within the growing 
literature on the religious beliefs and practices of ‘second generation’ Muslims in Western 
contexts, just as African Muslims have largely been neglected within this emerging field. 
Drawing on data collected over a total of 14 months among Senegalese migrant 
communities in the greater New York area, and in Islamic schools receiving migrants’ 
children in Dakar, Senegal, this paper outlines how young people’s homeland returns for 
the sake of religious education give rise to complex negotiations of meaning and identity. 




“You’re not gonna be in hell for eternity, right?” 
“Mohammed [the prophet], did he speak English or French?” 
“Was Adam black or white?” 
“On the day of judgement, will you be naked?” 
Oustaz Ly,1 who is teaching Islamic Studies to the middle and high school students at IQRA 
Bilingual Academy, a recently founded English-French bilingual Islamic school in Dakar, Senegal, 
very rarely manages to teach all of what he set out to teach during his lesson, be it the pillars of 
faith, the intricacies of praying correctly, or the rules of performing ablutions. Too numerous are 
                                                          
1 I have changed or removed the names of respondents where I felt it necessary to protect their identity. 
the questions with which his students keep side-tracking him, and he usually strives to answer 
them carefully. 
Some of the students’ questions reveal issues that preoccupy them during their daily lives 
outside of the Islamic studies classroom: mastering different languages (including English and 
French) is one such issue; having a particular skin colour is another. Other questions bespeak a 
genuine religious curiosity and even degree of anxiety, as the one on the amount of time a sinner 
will likely spend in hell. A final set of questions – like the one on being naked on the day of 
judgement – are mostly asked to raise laughs in the class (in this case successfully) and result in 
complaints on the part of teachers about the unruliness and irreverence of some of the ‘returnee’ 
students at the school.  
About a third of the students at IQRA Bilingual Academy weren’t born and raised in 
Senegal but have been sent ‘back’2 to their parents’ homeland in their late childhood or early 
adolescence from various places, including prominently the United States, but also France, 
Belgium and Italy. In many cases, the parents hope that a stint in a religious school in Senegal will 
protect their children from the unbelief and social decay they encounter in the deprived inner-city 
environments of their American, or European, homes. Drawing on data collected over a total of 14 
months among Senegalese migrant communities in the greater New York area, and in Islamic 
schools receiving migrants’ children in Dakar, Senegal, this paper explores how young people 
experience such ‘returns’, shedding light specifically on the religious dimensions of these 
experiences. The next section situates this paper in the literature. I outline debates on so-called 
                                                          
2 King and Christou (2011, 456) write aptly that ‘[i]n many respects, second-generation returnees are 
first-generation immigrants in their homelands’. Being sent ‘back’ can mean for some children 
going to a country they have never been to and that they know only indirectly from their parents’ 
tales, or phone calls with relatives there. 
‘second generation’ Muslim youths in the West and how the links between their ‘return’ mobilities, 
sense of belonging and religious orientations have been discussed. 
 
Muslim youths and ‘return’ mobilities  
The religious practices and beliefs of ‘second generation’ Muslims in the West have become the 
object of intense scrutiny in recent decades as politicians and the general public have tried to come 
to grips with acts of terror committed by members of this so-called ‘second generation’. Yet, as 
Bozorgmehr and Kasinitz (2018b, 4) rightly point out, ‘the disproportionate focus on a fringe 
extremist minority has obscured the experiences of the vast majority of Muslim youth.’ These 
experiences have begun to receive more scholarly attention recently. Researchers have sought to 
understand for example how young Muslims navigate the often divergent expectations of their 
families and of wider society, and how an increasingly hostile social and political environment 
affects their religious identities and sense of belonging (Bozorgmehr and Kasinitz 2018a; Haddad, 
Senzai, and Smith 2009; Levitt, Barnett, and Khalil 2011; Levitt, Lucken, et Barnett 2011; Rytter 
2010; Zine 2008).  
A persistent concern for researchers has been to understand differences in religious beliefs 
and practices among the ‘first’ and ‘second’ generations. Some authors have observed a trend 
towards greater ‘orthodoxy’ and stricter interpretations of Islam among ‘second generation’ 
youths, juxtaposed with declining religious adherence (e.g. Timmerman et al. 2003; Voas and 
Fleischmann 2012) or a ‘consumer’ approach to Islam, with young people ‘choosing which rules 
and tenets of their religion to embrace and which to dismiss’ (Cesari 2002, 41). However, recent 
research with transnationally mobile young people urges us to treat categories such as ‘first’ and 
‘second’ generation with caution. Such categories assign great importance to a person’s place of 
birth and first international move, neglecting the impact of further moves both within and across 
countries (van Geel and Mazzucato 2018, 2145). Alas, these moves may have an important impact 
on young people’s trajectories (ibid, see also Zeitlyn 2015, 68). 
How do young people’s connections to their ‘homeland’ relate to their religious identities 
and practices? Some authors have claimed that close and continued ties with the ‘homeland’ serve 
to smoothen the transmission of religious identities and doctrinal orientations across generations 
and transnational space. This argument has been made particularly to account for the fact that some 
Muslim diasporas appear to show greater ‘immunity’ to ‘radical’ forms of Islam than others (see 
Lesthaeghe 2002 in Levitt 2003, 852-3, with respect to Turkish versus Moroccan youths in 
Belgium; see Babou n.d. with respect to West African diasporas).  
However, recent research paying closer attention to the perspectives and experiences of 
transnationally mobile young Muslims themselves suggests a more complicated picture, as 
homeland visits/stays affect the ways in which young people position themselves vis-à-vis this 
‘homeland’, the societies they grew up in, as well as their religion in complex ways (Bolognani 
2014; Erdal et al. 2016; Reisel, Bredal, and Lidén 2018; Zeitlyn 2015). Existing studies of young 
Muslims’ transnational mobility caution us against assuming that homeland visits/stays necessarily 
bring young people closer to the religious beliefs and practices of their parents. Zeitlyn (2015, 141) 
and Bolognani (2014) for example both note how the British-raised Bangladeshi and Pakistani 
youths in their respective researches came to regard the Islam practiced in their ‘homelands’ as 
culturally tainted and inferior to their own version of it (see also Reisel, Bredal, and Lidén 2018, 
166). According to Bolognani, such views allowed her participants to upgrade their own social 
position in Pakistan (Bolognani 2013, 114-5). This highlights the importance of paying attention 
to the wider social dynamics of ‘homeland’ visits. 
Several scholars emphasise how ‘homeland’ visits/stays can give rise to ambivalent 
feelings as young people are taken out of their habitual environment and must learn a new ‘habitus’ 
(Zeitlyn 2015; see also Tiilikainen 2011; Abotsi, n.d.; Sancho 2018 in this special issue). Zeitlyn 
(2015, 136) describes how such ambivalence led some young British-Bangladeshi in his research 
‘towards religion as a source of identity and certainty’ and away from nationally/ethnically defined 
identities. The young Norwegians of Pakistani and Somali heritage in Reisel et al.’s (2018, 168) 
research, who visited their ‘homelands’ for religious education, conversely, returned to Norway 
with greater appreciation for Norwegian society and culture after having acquired a point of 
comparison. These observations chime with the wider recognition in the literature on migrant 
transnationalism that ‘returns’ do not inevitably strengthen migrants’ identification with their 
‘homelands’. ‘Returnees’ may discover that their homelands are different from what they 
expected, or have changed during their absence, and that they feel ‘out of place’ where they 
expected to feel home (e.g. Oeppen 2013, 271; see also Carling and Pettersen 2014). 
This paper adds to the debates outlined here by exploring the experiences of young people 
who are sent ‘back’ to Senegal, highlighting how stints in Islamic schools there do not 
automatically produce the ‘educated persons’ (Levinson and Holland, 1996)3 desired by teachers 
and parents, but give rise to complex negotiations of meaning and identity, in which young people 
mobilise frames of reference of various origins (cf. Levitt, Lucken, and Barnett 2011, 468). 
Coming to terms with an unfamiliar social and cultural environment and disciplinary regime in 
                                                          
3 Levinson and Holland (1996, 2) propose this notion to refer to the often contested, constantly renegotiated 
‘set of criteria by which members [of a given society] can be identified as more, or less, 
knowledgeable’. This paper uses it broadly to shed light onto competing ideas about desirable 
behavior and appropriate strategies for inculcating it. 
Senegal is central to the experiences of the young people in this paper, highlighting the importance 
of the wider social dynamics of homeland returns. 
What is more, when young people ‘return’ to Senegal, they rarely encounter life and 
religion exactly as their migrant parents left them behind at the time they emigrated. Over the past 
few decades, new types of Islamic schools have popped up, prospered, and expanded. Some of 
these schools have explicitly sought to attract migrants’ children, and some have succeeded so 
much at this that they have turned into veritable ‘little Americas’. This paper explores some of 
these new developments, which parallel trends observed in other parts of the world that have 
received significant numbers of return migrants (e.g. Erdal et al. 2016 on Pakistan; Lindley 2008, 
on Somalia). Erdal et al. (2016, 842) describe how residential segregation and demand for private 
English language schools among returnees in Pakistan ‘complicat[es] the picture of what kind of 
Pakistan they return to’. This paper describes how young Senegalese-Americans ‘return’ to places 
and practices that have emerged in Senegal only relatively recently and partly due to transnational 
migration, complicating the idea that homeland returns produce intergenerational continuity. 
By shedding light on the experiences of young Muslims of sub-Saharan African origin and 
the dynamics surrounding their returns, the paper complements existing studies of Muslim youths, 
which have mostly focused on South Asian, Middle Eastern and North African communities. This 
is true both for studies focusing on processes of religious identity formation and Islamic education 
in Western settings (Bozorgmehr and Kasinitz 2018a; Haddad, Senzai, and Smith 2009; 
Mandaville 2007; Zine 2008) and for those exploring such processes in the context of transnational 
mobility (Bolognani 2014; Erdal et al. 2016; Reisel, Bredal, and Lidén 2018; Zeitlyn 2015). In the 
West African context, a growing number of authors study transnational child-rearing practices, 
documenting migrant parents’ decisions to send children to the homeland for ‘disciplining’, to 
protect them from what are considered to be the morally corrupting or outright physically 
dangerous influences of Western society (Abotsi 2018; Bledsoe and Sow 2011; Coe and Shani 
2015; Kea and Maier 2017; Timera 2002), to prevent school failure (see Dia 2016 on children sent 
from France to Senegal) or finally to free up their time to work (see Coe 2014 on Ghanaian 
migrants in the US; see Grysole 2018 on Senegalese migrants in the US and Italy). Religious 
motivations for sending children back have received relatively little attention within this body of 
literature, even though migrants from several West African countries including Senegal, the 
Gambia, Mauritania, Guinea and Mali are known to send their children back to their home country 
for the sake of religious education (Kane 2011; Kea 2016; Razy 2006). What is more, most authors 
prioritise the perspectives of parents and pay limited attention to young people’s own views on 
return (for a notable exception, see Abotsi 2018). This paper complements the existing literature 
by focussing specifically on the religious dimensions of return and on young people’s own 
experiences. 
The next section describes data and research context. I then explore the Senegalese case, 
outlining how living in a Western setting (New York and New Jersey) has heightened demands 
for religious education among Senegalese migrant parents who hope that Islamic knowledge will 
help protect their children against the presumed evils of Western society, or, conversely, bring 
them back to the ‘straight and narrow’. The second part of the paper explores young people’s 
participation in, and experiences of, the Islamic education sector in Senegal, challenging narratives 
equating homeland returns with intergenerational continuity in the transmission of religious 
identities, and with it the smooth production of one particular type of ‘educated person’. 
 
Data and research context 
The data for this paper were collected during seven months of fieldwork carried out in Dakar, the 
capital of Senegal, which is a 95% Muslim country, between 2014 and 2016, and during seven 
months of fieldwork carried out in New York and adjacent New Jersey in the United States in 2017 
and 2018. I collected data in the form of ethnographic fieldwork observations in different schools 
(including Islamic schools) in both Senegal and the US, where I interviewed headmasters, teachers 
and students. I also collected data more widely through semi-structured interviews, group 
conversations and casual interactions with Senegalese migrants and their children in non-school 
settings in both Senegal and the US. I chose New York/New Jersey as fieldwork locations since 
‘New Yorkers’ were well represented among the sent back children and youths I met in Senegal, 
and because the greater New York area is a hub for Senegalese migrants in the US. 
While I gained access to Islamic schools and to returnees relatively easily in Senegal, 
conditions in the US were more challenging. As a white, non-Muslim woman, I struggled to win 
the trust of Senegalese migrants in a context where surveillance of Muslim communities has 
sharply increased since 9/11, making people weary of outside enquirers. The current political 
climate under the Trump Administration has exacerbated fears, especially among unauthorised 
migrants, of government crackdowns and deportation. Given the heightened scrutiny to which 
immigrant parents are submitted by child protection agencies, people are cautious to not reveal 
potentially compromising information to outsiders. My German nationality, familiarity with 
Senegal and with Islamic education (I studied Qur’anic schools in northern Nigeria for my PhD), 
and knowledge of French and Wolof (Senegal’s lingua franca) could only do so much to allay 
people’s fears. Winning their trust became possible only through long-term engagement with the 
community (including by living in two Senegalese households in Harlem and the Bronx for the 
duration of my fieldwork) and upon repeated intercession on my behalf by trusted members of the 
community. Most interviews with young people were conducted in English, which they felt most 
comfortable in, though some switched into Wolof occasionally. Interviews with parents were 
conducted both in English, French, and Wolof (with occasional help from a friend acting as 
translator). 
 
Parents’ ideals of the ‘educated person’ and transnational childrearing 
Many Senegalese parents share certain expectations about how children ought to be/behave, often 
with the implicit assumption that these expectations conform to Islamic norms. Respect for elders 
is a central value they hope to instil, alongside a sense of responsibility for others, especially family 
members, and a commitment to discipline and hard work (cf. Abotsi n.d. in this special issue). 
Parents also expect their children to take their religious practice – notably their daily prayers – 
seriously, to adopt a ‘decent’ dress code and demeanour,4 and to stay away from comportments 
considered problematic and un-Islamic, including premarital sex (especially for girls), same-sex 
relationships, and the consumption of drugs and alcohol. Many parents believe that studying the 
Qur’an, and the Islamic religion more broadly, will help strengthen their children’s commitment 
to these norms, echoing Ware’s (2014) emphasis on Qur’anic learning as ultimately aiming not 
merely at knowledge acquisition but at personal transformation, through imitating the 
                                                          
4 For girls, this mostly means dressing and behaving modestly. For boys, notions of appropriate dress and 
demeanour are more fluid, even though I encountered frequent and fierce opposition to American 
youth fashion styles, notably trousers worn ‘down’, letting the underwear show. 
comportment of the teacher. One mother in New York, who had sent her son to a Qur’anic school 
in Senegal, summarised the importance for learning the Qur’an as follows: 
with the Qur’an, you can’t be a bad person. Maybe if someone learned the Qur’an and come 
back [from Senegal] being bad boy or bad girl [sic], sooner or later, he’s gonna come back in 
the right path. Because the Qur’an does something ... 
There are a number of full-time private Islamic schools in New York and adjacent New 
Jersey, yet they are mostly too costly for Senegalese families, especially if they have to cater to 
several children.5 Many children attend weekend Qur’anic schools. However, many parents find 
the training they provide cannot counterbalance the wider influences their children are exposed to, 
and feel unable to transmit, let alone enforce, the behavioural norms they seek to instil. The 
participants in my research found themselves weighed down with various social and economic 
pressures, including frequent divorces,6 busy work schedules limiting the time they could spend 
with their children, and high rent prices, which often confined them to socially deprived inner-city 
neighbourhoods. In this context, parents worried that they could not sufficiently protect their 
daughters’ sexuality, and that their sons may drift off into gang violence, drugs, and delinquency. 
Parents feel unable to ensure that children acquire the requisite religious knowledge to withstand 
                                                          
5 Private full-time Islamic schools mostly charge fees of 400$ minimum per month. While flights to 
Senegal are also costly (a return flight from New York to Dakar costs around 1,000$), general living 
costs are significantly lower in Senegal, and fees in most Islamic schools are below 100$ per month 
(upmarket bilingual schools charge almost as much as US-based schools though). 
6 Marriages are extremely fragile in a context where both spouses work long hours outside the home. This 
triggers conflicts about the distribution of domestic chores, and about financial responsibility for the 
household budget (see Kane 2011, 167ff for an extensive discussion of the renegotiation of gender 
roles and the resulting marital conflicts among Senegalese couples in New York). 
these perceived risks, but they also feel barred from exerting the strict discipline (including 
physical punishments) they believe necessary to keep children on the right track. One of the 
mothers I was close to in New York, for example, criticised American child protection policies in 
stark terms, arguing that barring parents from disciplining their children when they are young puts 
these at risk of suffering the full force of the (racist) carceral state later in life: 
the thing that makes me so mad is that you’re telling them [the children] now that it’s abuse, 
but down the line, if they start doing stuff, you’re putting them in jail! Isn’t that abuse too? 
You don't want nobody to correct them while they’re young, when it can be done, and then 
when they become something else, when they’re adults or young adults, you’re ready to put 
them in jail. That’s not right! … I feel like they’re sacrificing our children. 
The combination of the factors outlined here motivates a significant number of migrants in 
the US to send their children back to Senegal at one point or another. Some migrants’ children 
spend all their childhood and youth in Senegal and move to the US only for high school or tertiary 
education, or to start work. Others spend only their early childhood (ca. 2-5 years) in Senegal, 
usually looked after by grandparents or other family members when their care is particularly 
burdensome for their parents in the US given busy work schedules and the high costs of 
professional childcare. Other children leave the US when they are old enough to be accepted into 
a Qur’anic boarding school, usually around age six or seven, and return to the US one or several 
years later after having acquired some knowledge of the Qur’an. Another frequent practice is to 
send young people, especially boys, back to Senegal at the beginning of adolescence for 
disciplining or to get them out of trouble. Finally, children may visit Senegal during their summer 
holidays, and take classes with an oustaz (Qur’anic teacher), or enrol in a Qur’anic school, for the 
duration of their stay. 
While my research in Senegal focused mostly on young people enrolled in Qur’anic 
boarding schools and on young people sent back in early adolescence, in my research in the US, I 
also interviewed young people who had spent most of their childhood and youth in Senegal and 
returned to the US only for middle or high school. This paper focusses in particular on the 
experiences of young people who grew up mostly in the US but went to Senegal in late childhood 
and early adolescence (when aged 8-14 years). Although the paper draws on the experiences of all 
my respondents, much of the interview material cited stems from interviews with male youths (14-
17 years) who had been sent back to Senegal for ‘disciplining’ and who made up a big share of the 
‘returnee’ population in the schools I studied. 
 
Young returnees’ participation in the Islamic education sector 
Migrant parents have come to rely on a broad array of Islamic educational institutions in Senegal, 
ranging from summer Qur’an programmes or enrolment in local Qur’anic schools during the 
summer vacation, to stints of several months or years in a Qur’anic boarding school, to enrolment 
for several years or even entire school careers in a so-called French-Arabic school (école franco-
arabe) or in one of the recently founded, diaspora-oriented English-French ‘bilingual’ Islamic 
schools. Besides these more institutionalised settings, young people sent back to Senegal also learn 
about Islam from Qur’anic teachers (oustaz) who come to teach them at home, and from observing 
and participating in the everyday routines of their relatives, neighbours, and peers in a 
predominantly Muslim environment. Parents thus choose among a wide variety of different 
arrangements, and it is beyond the scope of this paper to explore all of them in detail. The 
remainder of this section will highlight that to some extent, migrants have been looking for 
particular setups for educating their children in Senegal. This in turn has left traces on the Islamic 
education sector (cf. Erdal et al. 2016; Lindley 2018; Sancho, this special issue, on comparable 
dynamics in other contexts). 
Importantly, many migrant parents are acutely aware that in order to be successful one day 
within American society, their children need to become ‘educated persons’ not only proficient in 
religious knowledge and appropriate comportment, but also with a solid secular education and 
good English language skills (cf. Erdal et al. 2016, 842, who describe how returnee parents in 
Pakistan emphasise the importance of tarbyiat or moral instruction for their children while 
simultaneously ‘do[ing] what they can to also secure the best possible formal education’ for them). 
This has meant that both ‘intensive’ Qur’an programmes – which seek to instil Islamic knowledge 
(and notably knowledge of the Qur’an) into children quickly – and English-French bilingual 
Islamic schools – which teach Islamic knowledge, while simultaneously making sure that students 
are prepared for eventual reintegration into the American education system – have gained great 
popularity among migrant parents. One of my respondents, for example, explained her own 
reasoning about sending her son to a Qur’anic boarding school in Senegal for a year in the 
following way: 
[sending them back will] put dine [religion] in them fast … in a year, you have [memorised] 
half of the [Qur’an], you’re done, and then they can go back to an American school. 
‘Modern’ Qur’anic boarding schools (daara moderne), which focus exclusively on 
Qur’anic memorisation, while taking care of children’s basic needs in terms of food and hygiene, 
are currently an up-and-coming business in Senegal. While such schools are popular of course not 
only among migrant parents but also among many local ‘middle class’ parents (who can afford the 
30,000-60,000 FCFA per month, ca. 50-100$, for room and board), I have met significant numbers 
of migrants’ children (up to a quarter of students) in very much all the slightly more comfortable 
Qur’anic boarding schools I visited in Dakar. 
Another noteworthy development relating to young returnees indicated above is the 
opening of English-French bilingual Islamic schools. As I develop in more details elsewhere (see 
Hoechner 2017), over the past decade, several English-French bilingual Islamic day schools have 
opened in Dakar, offering both religious instruction and an English-French bilingual curriculum. 
Such schools are sought after by better-off transnationally oriented Senegalese families who expect 
their children to acquire a ‘cosmopolitan’ education and learn English in anticipation of future 
mobility. Migrants are another primary target group of these schools. In the bilingual Islamic 
school I studied closely, about a third of the school’s almost 300 students were foreign-born 
children who had either moved back to Senegal with their parents, or had been sent back on their 
own to stay there with family members. The majority of teachers were themselves either 
Senegalese return migrants (often coming back from North America), or international migrants 
(including from Anglophone parts of Africa and from the US). As one can imagine, the 
environment of this school is very different from ‘typical’ Senegalese Islamic schools, with 
English (rather than the local language Wolof) dominating schoolyard conversations, and students 
– rather than copying quietly from the blackboard – interrupting their Deenyat (Islamic studies) 
teacher repeatedly with questions about anything and everything, not stopping short even of 
apparently irreverent questions such as whether one would be naked on the Day of Judgement (see 
beginning of this paper).  
While these newer setups exist of course alongside more ‘classical’ / time-honoured 
Islamic educational institutions, I highlight them here to draw attention to the fact that the Islamic 
education sector is highly dynamic, and responds to changing social conditions, including 
transnational migration. The institutions in which migrants’ children find themselves are likely to 
be significantly different from those in which their parents once studied, which cautions against 
hasty conclusions about the neat intergenerational or transnational reproduction of a particular type 
of ‘educated person’. The next section further corroborates this argument by exploring the 
experiences of young people who have travelled back to Senegal in their late childhood or teenage 
years. I met most of them in the bilingual Islamic day school just described; but I also draw on 
data collected in a Qur’anic boarding school in the suburbs of Dakar and among youths who had 
returned to the US after having spent some time in Senegal. All these youths had spent a significant 
part of their childhood/youth in the US, which had equipped them with particular frames of 
reference through which they interpreted their experiences in Senegal. 
 
Seeing Islamic education in Senegal through young ‘American’ eyes 
The young people in my research experienced their visits/stays in Senegal as simultaneously 
exciting and unsettling, echoing the findings of other researchers (Tiilikainen 2011; Zeitlyn 2015; 
see also Abotsi n.d.; Sancho 2018 in this special issue). Especially the younger children among 
my respondents usually appreciated the freedom to go visit relatives and friends, and to play 
outside. At the same time, complaints about the food, heat, noise, pollution, and ‘indiscipline’ in 
traffic and with respect to littering were omnipresent in my conversations with children and youths 
raised in Western settings. Some youths – notably those who had been returned to Senegal against 
their will, and sometimes even without their knowledge7 – declared to outright ‘hate’ Senegal. 
                                                          
7 While these youths had been told that they were going on vacation to Senegal, their parents intended to 
leave them there for longer. 
Yet, even the most disgruntled and discontented teenagers acknowledged to some extent 
that Senegal could be wholesome, notably in terms of religion. When I asked my teenage 
respondents how they would proceed if they had children themselves one day, most conceded that 
sending them to Senegal was a good idea, not least to learn about their religion. The young people 
appreciated almost without exception the opportunity to acquire new religious knowledge, ranging 
from basic notions of Islamic eschatology, to the intricacies of performing ablutions (ritual 
cleansing) and prayers. Not all of them had been practising Muslims before. Coming to Senegal 
changed this in most cases, not least because the young people were taught about the other-worldly 
consequences of their worldly actions. Abdoul (16 years old), for example, explained that in the 
US, 
 I didn't believe in anything. They used to force me to pray and stuff like that.  
 And what made you change? 
 When I came here, when I learned about, if I die, what's gonna happen, stuff like that. 
At the same time, being in Senegal took off the young people’s back the pressures of having 
to stand one’s ground as part of a vilified minority against an overwhelmingly deprecatory 
environment. 14-year-old Abidine put it the following way:  
 You know ISIS, … they think ISIS is Muslim, and that's what Muslim people do, 
terrorism and stuff. So when they see a Muslim, they get scared and stuff. 
 But it's ignorance! And here, is it easier to be Muslim here? 
 Yeah! Senegal, everybody – mostly. I’d say I’m Muslim here with no problem, cause 
here, it’s nothing different, everybody is … you could be anything you want. 
While most young people appreciated being in a Muslim-majority environment where they 
were not singled out as ‘other’, there are important nuances to be highlighted. Some of the girls I 
interviewed for example wore the hijab both in the US and in Senegal. Interestingly, this placed 
them in a minority position in both places. While there are important variations in the practice of 
veiling reflecting ‘multiple parameters of identity’ (Leblanc 2000, 443), including ethnicity and 
socio-economic status, the general trend in Dakar is that older women cover their hair when they 
move in public spaces. Younger women, on the other hand, including married women, often don’t 
or only occasionally. Most women who do consistently wear a hijab (closed under the chin and 
covering neck and shoulders), identify with the ‘Sunni’ (or reformist) current, which is 
minoritarian in overwhelmingly Sufi Senegal.8 There have been recurrent tensions between these 
two currents of thought. Girls and women – who can easily be identified as ‘Sunni’ by their hijab 
– are often at the receiving end of these conflicts. One American-raised girl (17 years) for example 
told me how, in terms of religion, being in Senegal did not feel that different from being in the US 
to her (even though she enjoyed seeing mosques dotting the landscape): as a hijabi, she was still a 
minority, and subject to critical commentary by cousins who told her that she was too young to 
wear a hijab (cf. Zeitlyn 2015, 144, whose young British Bangladeshi respondent found that 
‘wearing a headscarf was most problematic when she visited her well-educated middle-class 
family in Bangladesh’). 
What I have described so far are mixed feelings about Senegal, yet a general appreciation 
of living in a majority-Muslim environment, even though this feeling is to some extent refracted 
                                                          
8 I have decided to use the term ‘Sunni’ here as this is how most people referred to themselves, rather than 
using the more loaded exonyms ‘Salafi’ or, in Senegalese parlance, ‘Ibadou’. Most Sufi Muslims 
would of course also claim to be following the Sunnah of Prophet Mohammed. According to the 
Pew Research Center, 92% of Senegalese Muslims say they belong to a Sufi order (2012, 31). 
Admittedly, some young women wear the hijab (occasionally) without adopting a reformist 
orientation. To some extent, the hijab has become a fashion statement, indexing, because of its 
association with the Arab world, a certain cosmopolitanism. 
by differences in gender and religious orientation. I now turn to instances when the young people 
in my research evaluated Islamic practice in Senegal critically, corroborating the findings of other 
authors (Bolognani 2014; Zeitlyn 2015) that homeland visits may also to some extent widen 
cultural and religious divides. In my research, diaspora youths commented unfavourably on Islam 
and Islamic educational practices in Senegal, mobilising normative frames of reference that were 
apparently ‘American’ in origin. However, this was mostly done in an effort to reclaim autonomy 
from elders who laid claim to the prerogative of religious interpretation.9 This highlights the 
importance of paying attention to the wider social dynamics of ‘homeland’ visits, including 
intergenerational power dynamics and parental disciplinary projects (cf. the arguments made by 
Abotsi n.d.; and Sancho 2018 in this special issue). 
Several of my young respondents found that people in Senegal were mixing ‘culture’ and 
‘religion’. Daouda (14 years old) for example explained that in his view,  
in Senegal, people, they change the religion kind of. Because they have the animists, and the 
Christian beliefs before, and they kind of added it again with Islam.10 
Ousmane (18 years old) argued that notably older people were guilty of mixing culture and 
religion, claiming that they would say things that are not actually mentioned in the Qur’an, 
                                                          
9 When my respondents commented on the religious practice of their Senegalese age-mates, it was mostly 
to state that they were less pious than they made people believe (especially the girls), which 
bespeaks a certain desire to not be regarded as the only youths with religious ‘shortcomings’. 
10 The history of Christianity in Senegal is of course much shorter than that of Islam, which arrived in the 
region in the 11th century. The first Europeans arrived on the West African coast at the end of the 
15th century, but most busied themselves with the slave trader rather than with evangelization. 
Missionary activity gathered pace mostly in the 19th century. 
but they base it on their culture and say, that’s not good, you shouldn’t be doing it, and it’s not 
even mentioned in the Qur’an. 
Particularly in cases where Islam was mobilised to regulate their own behaviour, the young 
people in my research were critical of the religious justifications presented to them, especially if 
these targeted behaviour that, in their experience, had passed as normal until then. One particularly 
contentious issue was hairstyling. In Senegal, most boys and young men wear their hair shortly 
cropped, and both longer hair and elaborate hairstyling are reserved for girls and women.11 Several 
of the American-raised male youths I met during my research had grown accustomed to 
fashionable hairstyling in the US, which included both longer hair and more sophisticated cuts. 
When they showed up at their Islamic school with such hairstyles, tensions resulted with the school 
administration that insisted on close-cropped hair. Mohammed (17 years old) recounted his 
experience: 
they told me I gotta cut off my hair, and I was like: ‘why do I have to cut off my hair, it’s 
just a hairstyle!’ And then they started talking about, ahm, why it’s illegal in Islam to have a 
hairstyle like, you cut the sides, you leave the sides [middle?], and I never actually heard 
somebody tell me that until I came here. And then it made me feel weird, I was like, ok then, 
imma just gonna cut it up. Because, when like, when you’re in a place, you just have to – it’s 
just easier to just follow the rules and not try to bring your own [rules], cause they’re gonna 
win. 
                                                          
11 Women’s use of hair attachments spark a certain controversy though, with stricter Muslims looking 
upon it critically, arguing that ‘adding’ something to the body amounts to saying that Allah has 
created imperfect bodies. There is also a prominent exception to the rule of short hair for men. So-
called Baye Fall, disciples of Mouride Cheikh Ibrahima Fall, a contemporary 
of Cheikh Amadou Bamba, commonly wear dreadlocks – though this meets with some disapproval 
from Muslims of other religious orientations. 
In the case described here, the youth remained sceptical whether Islam really required him 
to have close-cropped hair, but eventually gave in because he did not want to exacerbate tensions 
with the school administration. The school administration’s insistence on short hair did not 
resonate with his prior experiences, and thus he struggled to give it credit. In a similar way, the 
young people in my research commented critically also on other practices. For example, the 
beatings frequently dealt out in Islamic schools (as well as private households and secular state 
schools) in Senegal as a form of discipline were a frequent object of critical commentary. 
Arguably, many parents – and even children12 – across West Africa consider disciplining involving 
physical punishments an essential part of child-rearing and forming appropriately ‘educated 
persons’. As Last (2000, 376) writes about northern Nigeria, without ‘external shaping’ in the form 
of discipline and physical hardship ‘a child is scarcely human, and certainly not a proper Muslim’. 
Such an ideology underpins the harsh physical punishments dealt out in Qur’anic schools across 
West Africa (Ware 2014; Hoechner 2018).  
Conversely, in the US, child protection laws forbid harsh physical punishments, and 
children are encouraged to report these to the authorities. Having grown up in the US, the 
American-raised youths in my research considered beatings critically as ‘abuse’ and ‘violence’ 
rather than legitimate and even ‘necessary’ disciplining (cf. Abotsi’s paper in this special issue on 
British-raised youngsters’ discontent about the strict disciplinary regime of their Ghanaian school). 
Daouda (14 years old) for example stated about his experience in a classical Qur’anic school that: 
                                                          
12 I gave English and French lessons in Qur’anic schools in Senegal and Nigeria, and on various 
occasions, my students told me that if I wanted my class to be quiet, I would have to beat them. 
they use, like, violence to press their views, and I don't really like that. Just teach someone 
through, like, words, and not through violence. If you use violence, they're [the students] 
probably not gonna listen to it, so – or if they do, they're not really gonna believe in [it]…13 
A last example that illustrates how the young people in my research mobilized normative 
frameworks of ‘Western’ origin to make sense of the realities they encountered in Senegal 
concerns the gender segregation commonly practiced in Islamic boarding schools in Senegal, with 
boys and girls usually studying in separate facilities (cf. Abotsi’s description in this special issue 
of how her British-Ghanaian respondents mobilised children’s rights discourses to criticise 
Ghanaian educational practices). Many aspects of daily life in Senegal, starting with the division 
of labour within the household, are highly gendered, and even though the exact contours of 
gendered differences may be the subject of discussion and negotiation (e.g. what kind of work 
contributions can be expected from males within the household), it is usually taken as a given that 
differences are an objective reality and legitimate basis for differential treatment. I have never 
heard anyone from Senegal commenting on gender segregation in Islamic schools in negative 
terms. Even though not all Islamic schools separate students by gender, most Senegalese do not 
seem to take issue with schools that do. Mohammed, a mostly American-raised youth (17 years), 
on the other hand, commented on this critically: 
I think separating is kind of sexist! I mean religion shouldn’t mean like you gotta separate 
people. People could still be together and not, like – they think like if you mix them, there’s 
gonna be sin or whatever. But I think like the more people socialise with each other, the better. 
Cause if you separate people, they won’t know how to share ideas. 
                                                          
13 These critical comments were made outside of the Islamic schools where the beatings had taken place 
and in retrospect. 
When passing critical judgement on particular ‘Senegalese’ religious practices, the young 
people in my research thus mobilized normative frames of reference of apparently ‘American’ 
origin, even though they found themselves in Senegal at the time and had in many cases been there 
already for several years. That the disciplinary projects of parents and elders were particularly 
likely to be evaluated through ‘American’ lenses highlights again the importance of paying 
attention to the social dynamics of homeland visits/stays. 
 
Conclusion 
Homeland visits and stays have only recently began to receive attention within the growing 
literature on the religious beliefs and practices of ‘second generation’ Muslims in Western 
contexts, just as African Muslims have largely been neglected within this emerging field. Drawing 
on data collected among Senegalese migrants and their children in Senegal and the US, this paper 
adds to the nascent scholarship exploring young Muslims’ experiences of return mobility. 
I explore the longer-term consequences of homeland returns for young people’s future 
trajectories elsewhere in greater depth (Hoechner forthcoming). Suffice it to say here that such 
returns not only strengthen young people’s self-confidence as Africans and blacks, but also 
produce new sets of vulnerabilities as young people may struggle to (re-)adjust to the social 
environment and disciplinary regime of the US and lack the English language skills to do well in 
school and college. As described in this paper, in terms of religion, visits to and stays in Senegal 
allowed the young people in my research to develop a new and overall more serene relationship 
with Islam, not least because they found themselves in an environment where being Muslim 
attracts no disdain and indeed connotes positively. This did not, of course, mean that their prior 
experiences and ‘American’ frames of reference became completely obsolete. Returning to 
Senegal is an ambivalent experience for young people who have spent most of their previous lives 
in the US. It requires adjustments on various levels, ranging from the mundane details of everyday 
life to wider epistemological / eschatological ideas. Young people are not blackboards whose 
contents can be erased and rewritten at will. Instead, they draw on their previous experiences and 
normative frameworks as they critically appraise the practices they observe and treatments they 
receive in Senegal. The young people in this study were particularly likely to pass critical 
judgement on ‘Senegalese’ religious / educational practices in situations when (presumably) 
religious norms were mobilised to regulate their behaviour and to discipline them. This highlights 
that homeland visits do not necessarily produce complete agreement between parents, teachers and 
youths about what exactly an ideal ‘educated person’ is, and what appropriate strategies are for 
producing it. 
Finally, this paper pointed to the changes taking place within Senegal’s educational 
landscape as new educational offers emerge to cater to the transnationally mobile. This further 
complicates ideas about the transmission of religious identities and orientations across generations 
and transnational space. In the current context of growing Islamophobia and increasingly 
aggressive secularism in Western countries, many immigrant parents in the West are hard-pressed 
to bring up their children as practicing and self-respecting Muslims. It would not come as a surprise 
if Muslim homelands and the educational offers emerging in these were to gain in importance in 
the future as places where migrants educate their children, adding further urgency to the 
exploration of the dynamics described in this paper. 
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